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AT THE CROSSROADS OF TITLE IX AND A NEW “IDEA”: WHY
BULLYING NEED NOT BE “A NORMAL PART OF GROWING UP” FOR
SPECIAL EDUCATION CHILDREN
PAUL M. SECUNDA*

I. INTRODUCTION
1

In 21st century America, bullying of children by other children at school
2
continues at epidemic levels. Organizations as diverse as the Department of
Health and Human Services (through the National Institutes of Health and
3
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)), the National Crime
4
5
Prevention Council, the National Youth Violence Prevention Resource Center,
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this article to my parents, Lynne and Steve Secunda, and my maternal grandparents, Joseph and
Edith Godick, who taught me early on in life through their words and deeds that the worth of a person can only be measured from the inside out.
1. "Bullying may be physical, involving hitting or otherwise attacking the other person; verbal,
involving name-calling or threats; or psychological, involving spreading rumors or excluding a
person." News Release, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, National
Institutes of Health (NIH), Bullying Widespread in U.S. Schools, Survey Finds (Apr. 24, 2001),
available at http://www.nichd.nih.gov/new/releases/bullying.cfm
[hereinafter NIH News
Release]; see also NATIONAL YOUTH VIOLENCE PREVENTION RESOURCE CENTER, TEEN FACTS,
BULLYING, at http://www.safeyouth.org/scripts/teens/docs/bullying.pdf (2002) (noting that
bullying involves a wide range of behavior having in common trying to harm someone who is
weaker or more vulnerable) [hereinafter TEEN FACTS].
2. See James Snyder et al., Observed Peer Victimization During Early Elementary School:
Continuity, Growth, and Relation to Risk for Child Antisocial and Depressive Behavior, 74 CHILD DEV. 1881,
1885 (2003) (showing children age 5 to 7 may be bullied as often as once every three to six minutes);
AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, AACAP FACTS FOR FAMILIES #80: BULLYING
(Mar. 2001) (citing surveys that indicate as many as half of all children are bullied at some time
during their school years and 10% are bullied on a regular basis), http://www.aacap.org/
publications/factsfam/80.htm; John A. Calhoun, Editorial: New Survey Reveals Bullying Biggest Threat
Seen by U.S. Teens, CATALYST (Nat'l Crime Prevention Council, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2003 ("Six out
of ten American teenagers witness bullying in school once a day."), http://www.ncpc.org/ncpc/
ncpc/?pg=2088-8200-8206; NIH NEWS RELEASE, supra note 1 ("Bullying is widespread in American
schools, with more than 16 percent of U.S. school children saying they have been bullied by other
students during the current term . . . ." (reporting findings of Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors
among U.S. Youth: Prevalence and Association with Psychosocial Adjustment, 285 JAMA 2094 (2001)).
3. See NIH News Release, supra note 1.
4. See Calhoun, supra note 2.
5. See TEEN FACTS, supra note 1.
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and the National Education Association, have all targeted school bullying and
its consequences in various initiatives and campaigns over the last several
7
years. These organizations argue that if schools and parents do not properly
intervene to prevent bullying, the long-term ramifications for both the bully and
8
the bullied could be disastrous. In fact, there appears to be a new momentum
9
among parents and educators to take the problem of bullying more seriously.
Recent violence at schools across the country, including the now-infamous
10
Columbine school shooting, has made educators, parents, and children more
11
reluctant to accept that bullying is just a “normal part of growing up.”

6. See NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, NATIONAL BULLYING AWARENESS CAMPAIGN (NBAC), at
http://www.nea.org/schoolsafety/bullying.html (last updated Aug. 12, 2002) [hereinafter NAT'L
EDUC. ASS'N].
7. For instance, HRSA established the "Take a Stand. Lend a Hand. Stop Bullying Now!"
campaign in February 2004 to address issues surrounding bullying. See HEALTH RES. AND SERVICES
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, STOP BULLYING NOW, at
http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov (last visited June 2, 2004). The National Crime Prevention
Council, famous for McGruff the Crime Dog, launched the "Be Safe & Sound" campaign to "engage
parents in a comprehensive approach to school safety and security." Calhoun, supra note 2. The
National Education Association has launched the "National Bullying Awareness Campaign (NBAC)"
to "assist communities in developing solutions that will eradicate bullying from America's public
schools." NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, supra note 6. Last, a recent survey found that 32 states and the District
of Columbia have enacted some kind of bullying/harassment prevention program or legislation. See
EDITORIAL PROJECTS IN EDUCATION, VIOLENCE AND SAFTEY, at http://www.edweek.org/
context/topics/issuespage.cfm?id=39 (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (registration required).
8. See, e.g., Ian Janssen, et al., Associations Between Overweight and Obesity with Bullying Behavior
in School-Aged Children, 113 PEDIATRICS 1187, 1187 ("The social and psychological ramifications induced by the bullying-victimization process may hinder the social development of overweight and
obese youth, because adolescents are extremely reliant on peers for social support, identity, and selfesteem."); AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, supra note 2 ("Children who are bullied experience real suffering that can interfere with their social and emotional development . . . .
Some victims of bullying have even attempted suicide . . . ."); TEEN FACTS, supra note 1 (noting some
bullied teens may seek violent retaliation against their tormentors or suicide); NIH News Release,
supra note 1 (observing that both bullies and those bullied face social isolation, do poorly in school,
and are more likely to suffer from depression and low self-esteem).
9. See supra note 7; Jane Gross, Hot Topic at Summer Camps: Ending the Rule of the Bullies, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2004, at A1 (noting that, in the summer camp context, bullying is "this summer's hot
topic" and providing examples of camps hiring experts to help prevent potential bullying problems);
Kellie Patrick, Anti-Bully Policy Pairs Parents, Teachers, PHILA. INQUIRER, at http://www.philly.com/
mld/philly/living/education/9036441.htm (posted June 29, 2004) (describing school district's
expected passage of a new anti-bullying policy on July 27, 2004).
10. On April 20, 1999, in Littleton, Colorado, two disaffected Columbine High School students
went on a shooting rampage at their school, killing twelve students and one teacher, and wounding
dozens of others. See Investigators: 2 shooting suspects may have had help, CNN.COM, Apr. 22, 1999, at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9904/21/school.shooting.05/. For a comprehensive discussion of the
legal issues surrounding violence in school, see generally Jeff Horner & Wade Norman, Student Violence & Harassment, 182 EDUC. L. REP. 371 (2004).
11. See TEEN FACTS, supra note 1 ("[B]ullying among children and teenagers has often been
dismissed as a normal part of growing up."); NIH News Release, supra note 1 ("Being bullied is not
just an unpleasant rite of passage through childhood . . . . It's a public health problem that merits
attention."); see also Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-448-JD, 2001 WL 276975, at
*2, *6 (D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2001) (principal's "response and lack of action was clearly unreasonable and
demonstrated deliberate indifference," when he allegedly told harassed high school student that
"peers can be mean in high school, which is a part of growing up," and that he should accept his
offensive nickname and "move on"); Gross, supra note 9, at A15 ("'In our culture, there used to be a
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Even so, legal remedies for victims of bullying continue to be woefully
12
inadequate. Although victims of student-on-student sexual harassment have a
13
claim for compensatory damages under the federal gender discrimination in
14
education law, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Supreme
Court of the United States has yet to endorse the idea of a same-sex harassment
cause of action for more common forms of bullying under Title IX (i.e., boys
15
bullying boys or girls bullying girls). That being said, there is some hope that
same-sex harassment causes of action for bullying behavior may become more
16
common under Title IX as an increasing number of courts and the United States
17
Department of Education have adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s
18
Title VII decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
In these
instances, decisions have embraced Oncale’s central teaching that same-sex
harassment need not depend upon sexual attraction or desire, but may also
derive from nonsexual animus based on the failure of the harassed individual to
19
live up to stereotypical gender norms.

belief that this was just the way it is,' said Larry Dieringer, executive director of Educators for Social
Responsibility, a group devoted to social and emotional education for children. 'Columbine changed
all that.'").
12. See infra Parts II and V. For instance, a bullied student could generally not sue a school district for tort damages because of sovereign immunity issues. See KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID
ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 632 (6th ed. 2004). Similarly, a tort action may be unavailable against responsible school officials because of these same principles. See, e.g., Lentz v.
Morris, 372 S.E.2d 608, 610-611 (Va. 1988) (finding the doctrine of sovereign immunity protected a
high school physical education teacher from negligence claim). Finally, the problems with merely
filing a state law tort claim against the bullying student range from problems of proof, in both the
liability and damages arena, to the fact that the bullied student might not be able to receive the injunctive relief that is most important for the child's future in the school.
13. Compensatory damages may include "pain and suffering, humiliation, and other physical
and psychic harms." See Mark Weber, Damages Liability in Special Education Cases, 21 REV. LITIG. 83, 83
(2002) [hereinafter Weber, Damages Liability].
14. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000). As discussed below, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), is the Supreme Court case which first recognized a peer sexual harassment claim under Title IX. See infra Part II.D.
15. Although bullying also occurs between the sexes, as case illustrations develop below, most
nonsexual gender animus occurs in same-sex situations in which the stereotypical masculinity or
femininity of a student is at the center of the bullying. See infra Part II. D. As between male and
female same-sex bullying, males have been shown to be more likely to bully one another and more
likely to be the victim of bullying. See Snyder et al., supra note 2, at 1883 ("Boys are consistently more
aggressive and dominance oriented than girls, and most peer interaction during childhood occurs in
same-gender groups.") (citing E.E. MACCOBY, THE TWO SEXES: GROWING UP APART, COMING TOGETHER
(1998)). Moreover, males were more likely to say they had been bullied physically, whereas females
were more likely to say they had been bullied verbally or psychologically. See NIH News Release,
supra note 1.
16. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
17. See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TITLE IX, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 3
(January 2001) [hereinafter REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE].
18. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). In Oncale, the Supreme Court recognized a same-sex harassment cause of
action in the employment context under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2000e-17 (2003). Id. at 79-80.
19. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 ("[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to
support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably find such
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Indeed, research studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that those
victimized by bullying are typically students who do not fit stereotypical
notions of what it is to be masculine or feminine, athletic, cool, or “in” at
20
21
school.
Classic examples include not only children who are smaller,
22
23
24
25
younger, gay or effeminate, obese, or from different countries, but also
children who look and/or act differently from other children as a result of
26
physical and/or mental impairments (i.e., special education children). It is the
legal ramifications for verbally and physically abused special education

discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex- specific and derogatory terms
by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.").
20. See NIH News Release, supra note 1 ("[B]ullies were less likely to make derogatory statements about other students' religion and race," and more likely to belittle their appearance or behavior).
21. See, e.g., Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-448-JD, 2001 WL 276975, at *1
(D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2001) (noting that a male high school student "small for his age" was subjected to
physical and verbal same-sex peer harassment).
22. See AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, supra note 2.
23. See Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (D. Minn. 2000)
(noting that harassers appeared motivated not by sexual desire, but rather by hostility based upon
harassed student's perceived sexual orientation); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d
1165, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that middle school student was subjected to same-sex harassment
due to perceived homosexuality). There has been much written on the bullying and abuse of
children who are, or perceived to be, homosexual. See, e.g. Katie Feiock, The State to the Rescue: Using
State Statutes to Protect Children from Peer Harassment in School, 35 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 317
(2002); Thomas A. Mayes, Confronting Same-Sex, Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment:
Recommendations for Educators and Policy Makers, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 641 (2001); Jeffrey I. Bedell,
Note, Personal Liability of School Officials Under § 1983 Who Ignore Peer Harassment of Gay Students,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 829 (2003); Lynn Mostoller, Note and Comment, Freedom of Speech and Freedom
from Student on Student Sexual Harassment in Public Schools: The Nexus Between Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 33 N.M.
L. REV. 533 (2003). This article does not deal with same-sex harassment issues surrounding gay and
lesbian children, but instead focuses on nonsexual, gender animus directed toward children with
special education needs who do not meet stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity.
24. See Janssen, et al., supra note 8, at 1187.
25. See, e.g., Catherine Gewertz, N.Y.C. School to Address Complaints of Harassment, EDWEEK.ORG
June 9, 2004, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=39Harass.h23&keywords=gewertz
(registration required) (describing physical and verbal abuse of Asian-American immigrant children
at a Brooklyn, New York high school).
26. See Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 47, 194 F. Supp. 2d 939, 941-43 (D. Minn. 2002) (noting
that female special needs student was verbally sexually harassed by both male and female fellow
students in connection with a year book prank directed at her); see also Mark C. Weber, Disability
Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1079, 1090 (2002) [hereinafter, Weber,
Disability Harassment] ("Anyone who spent childhood in a public school in which special education
students attend with other students knows that the children who are different are subjected to verbal
abuse and physical intimidation everyday."); Gross, supra note 9, at A15 (describing typical victims
of bullying to include those who are disabled). This is not to say that children with physical or
mental impairments are all "special education" children; only those children with disabilities who
have impairments, which require the provision of special education and related services, are covered
under the federal special education law. See infra Part III.
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children, mostly by members of their own gender, upon which this article
27
focuses.
Presently, most observers, and even the Supreme Court in its seminal student-on-student sexual harassment decision, Davis v. Monroe County Board of
28
Education, have yet to undertake a sufficient evaluation of the complex legal is29
sues surrounding the bullying of special education children. To date, commentators and lower courts have primarily focused on the Title IX implications for
students subject to same-sex harassment by other students and then, mostly in
the context of harassment based on the actual, or perceived, sexual orientation of
30
the student. Yet, when another student bullies a special education child based
on that child’s appearance, behavior, or failure to live up to stereotyped notions
of gender, it is necessary to consider the intersection between Title IX and the
primary federal special education law, the Individuals with Disabilities in Edu31
cation Act (IDEA).

27. There is also evidence that special education children bully and assault regular and other
special education children at school. See, e.g., Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding
that special education female student was raped, sexually abused, and harassed by fellow male special education students); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999)
(finding that male special education student sexually assaulted and harassed female special education student). The topic of bullying by special education children presents separate, complicated
legal issues that are beyond the scope of this article. For a comprehensive discussion of issues surrounding the discipline of special education children, see generally Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in
Double Standards, Discipline, and the Disabled Student, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2000); Terry Jean Seligmann,
Not as Simple as ABC: Disciplining Children with Disabilities Under the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 42 ARIZ.
L. REV. 77 (2000); Perry A. Zirkel, The IDEA's Suspension/Expulsion Requirements: A Practical Picture,
134 EDUC. L. REP. 19 (1999).
28. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
29. But cf. Davis, 526 U.S. at 665-666 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (questioning how federal special
education law interacts with a peer sexual harassment theory under Title IX in cases in which the
special education child is the bully subjected to discipline). The lack of judicial notice given to the
predicament of bullied or harassed special education children is especially troubling as there are an
estimated 6.7 million special education students, which constitutes about 14% of the total American
public school population. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENT, STAFF, AND
GRADUATE COUNTS BY STATE: SCHOOL YEAR 2000-2001 (April 2002), at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2002/2002348.pdf (reporting the overall public school population in America in 2000-2001 as
47.2 million); Michelle R. Davis, Senate Approves Bill to Reauthorize IDEA, EDWEEK.ORG May 19, 2004,
at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=37IDEA.h23&keywords=IDEA (registration
required).
30. See, e.g., Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1077-78 (D. Nev. 2001) (alleging violation
of Title IX rights when school officials ignored gay high school student's complaints about sexual
orientation harassment); Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (D.
Minn. 2000) (noting that harassers appeared motivated not by sexual desire, but rather by hostility
based on the harassed student's perceived sexual orientation); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107
F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that middle school student was subjected to samesex harassment because of perceived homosexuality).
31. 20 U.S.C. §§1400-1487 (2000). Two other federal disabilities laws are also potentially applicable to the bullying of special education children. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1999), makes it unlawful for programs receiving federal financial assistance, including
schools, to discriminate or harass on the basis of disability. See Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist.,
240 F.3d 200, 206 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001); Monteiro v. Temple Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1032-33
(9th Cir. 1998). Similarly, Title II of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§
12131-12150 (2000), prevents state and local government entities, including public schools, from discriminating on the basis of disability in the providing of services and programs. These statutes are
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Under IDEA, children with disabilities are entitled to a free and
32
appropriate education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment practicable.
In turn, a FAPE includes special education and related services which are
reasonably calculated to permit a child with a disability to benefit
33
educationally. Consequently, actions taken by school districts to alleviate an
unpleasant bullying situation for a special education child in order to comply
with Title IX’s dictates concerning peer sexual harassment may inadvertently
also violate a child’s right to a FAPE by altering that child’s placement and/or
34
programs. To prevent placing school officials in this legal Catch-22, a legal
model needs to be developed which ties the overlapping statutory frameworks
of Title IX and IDEA together in one hybrid legal cause of action. Alternatively,
if Title IX’s stringent legal standards for peer sexual harassment cannot be met
in a given bullying case even after incorporating IDEA concepts, IDEA may also
provide legal bases for special education children to obtain monetary damages
against school officials who have failed to protect them from bullying, which, in
turn, has violated that child’s right to a FAPE under IDEA.
With these issues at the forefront, this article advocates two IDEA-based
legal models to increase the legal protections available for special education
children who are the subject of same-sex harassment/bullying at school. The
first proposal attempts to provide this additional protection by strengthening
the Davis Title IX framework for peer sexual harassment at school by
incorporating IDEA concepts directly into that framework. Under this hybrid
model, a school is liable for the same-sex harassment of a special education child
where (1) the school had actual notice of the harassment; (2) the character of the
harassment was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive; (3) the school’s
response to the known harassment was clearly unreasonable in light of its
obligations under Title IX and IDEA; and (4) the student was denied a free and
appropriate education in the least restrictive environment practicable or
otherwise denied access to appropriate educational opportunities and benefits
35
as a result of the harassment. Next, after addressing the lack of effective legal
theories of recovery outside the Title IX context because of various procedural
36
and substantive limitations on such claims, this article sets forth a second legal
model. The second legal model involves an IDEA-based § 1983 action for
37
money damages, while at the same time recognizing that special education

not discussed in greater detail in this article, as the focus of this article is not on the bullying of special education children because these children have a disability, but rather because their disability
leads other students of the same gender to regard them as not conforming to stereotypical notions of
masculinity and femininity. For an excellent discussion of disability harassment by teachers and
other students in the school context, including claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
Title II of the ADA, see Weber, Disability Harassment, supra note 26, at 1093-1134.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See id.
34. Just as a school's attempts to stop bullying can violate the special education rights of a child
under IDEA, so can the actual bullying acts interfere with the provision of a FAPE to a special education student. See infra Part III.
35. See infra Part IV.A.
36. See infra Part V.
37. See infra Part VI.
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plaintiffs should normally have to first exhaust their administrative remedies
38
under IDEA before bringing such a claim.
This article proceeds in the following manner: Part II sets forth the current
state of same-sex harassment law under Title IX and argues that the current
framework provides little effective relief for either regular or special education
children who are the subject of unlawful bullying. Part III outlines pertinent
IDEA provisions and their potential implications for bullied special education
children. Part IV advances a legal model that seeks to enhance the protections
for bullied special education children by strengthening the Title IX peer harassment framework by directing courts to consider special education students’
rights under IDEA when applying that framework. Part V examines various
procedural and substantive limitations on advancing a § 1983 action for money
damages in this context. Part VI advocates a second legal model, which seeks
the expanded use of an IDEA-based § 1983 action against school officials for
money damages for permitting bullying that subsequently interferes with a special education child’s rights under IDEA.
II. TITLE IX, SAME-SEX HARASSMENT, AND BULLYING
As consideration of same-sex harassment in the K-12 environment is an
inherently complex topic, this Part moves through a progression of subsections
to consider the issues piecemeal. In the first subsection, a general overview of
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is presented. Next, this article
considers how the dictates of Title IX have been applied in the peer (student-onstudent) harassment area. In the third subsection, the article examines the
parallel employment discrimination federal statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, in the same-sex harassment context to determine whether similar
principles should apply to the educational arena. Next, the lack of recognition
of Title IX same-sex claims, absent the presence of an assault, is considered.
Finally, this Part concludes by exploring whether additional legal protections
may exist for bullied special education students under IDEA.
A. Title IX Primer
39

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimina40
tion in schools which receive federal education funding. Although, as initially
drafted, Title IX was limited to administrative enforcement actions brought by
41
the federal government, by 1979 the United States Supreme Court recognized
that Title IX was enforceable by aggrieved individuals through an implied right

38. See infra Part V.B.2.
39. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
40. Title IX provides in relevant part: "No person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to, discrimination under any education
programs or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1682. The administrative mechanism requires the Office of Civil Rights within
the Department of Education to make schools aware of potential Title IX violations and to seek voluntary corrective action before pursuing fund termination or other enforcement mechanisms. See
REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 17, at iii-iv.
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of action. In 1992, the Supreme Court took two further important steps when it
recognized that sexual harassment was a type of sex discrimination under Title
IX and that consequently, monetary damages were available for private litigants
43
in such cases.
Although prior to 1992 it was clear that students alleging sexual discrimination and harassment at school could bring private damage suits under Title
IX, the standard for holding schools vicariously liable for the harassing acts of
44
their teachers and students was still unclear. It was not until 1998, in the semi45
nal Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District decision, that the Supreme
Court considered the question of teacher-on-student harassment and significantly limited the circumstances under which students could obtain money
46
damages for sexually harassing or abusive conduct by their teachers. Relying
47
on the Spending Clause authority upon which Title IX was enacted, as well as
48
the fact that Title IX was modeled on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Court held that Title IX was in the nature of a contract between the federal gov49
ernment and school funding recipient. As a result, in order for a school district
to be liable for the sexually harassing acts of its teachers, the Court found that
damages would have to arise from the misconduct of the school itself in han50
dling problems of sexual harassment or abuse by teachers. To establish such

42. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 728 (1979). Since Cannon, Congress has amended
Title IX twice and the fact that the implied private right of action remains intact has been construed
by the Supreme Court as a validation of Cannon's holding. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992).
43. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75; see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
651 (1999). The concept of sexual harassment originated from the Title VII case of Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71 (1986), in which the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination in the employment context. Id. at 67.
44. Title IX actions must be brought against the school district, as individual liability is not
available against school personnel. See Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999).
45. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
46. Id. at 277. See David S. Cohen, Limiting Gebser: Institutional Liability for Non-Harassment Sex
Discrimination Under Title IX, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 311, 311 (2004) (stating that the Supreme Court
set an "exacting standard" for liability under Title IX for teacher-on-student sexual harassment).
47. The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution states: "The Congress shall have the
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Title IX
operates by conditioning federal assistance to schools based on their promise not to permit sex discrimination in any of their activities or programs. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286.
48. Title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (1999).
49. Legislation enacted under the Spending Clause permits Congress to place conditions on the
grant of federal funds. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185-86 (2002). Consequently, the Gebser
Court observed that Spending Clause legislation like Title IX is "much in the nature of a contract: in
return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions." Gebser,
524 U.S. at 286 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
50. See Doe v. Green, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032 (D. Nev. 2004) (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 641).
The Supreme Court rejected a direct liability or negligence standard for imputing liability against a
school district for the acts of its teachers because of the Spending Clause and the contractual nature
of the statute. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284-286.
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actionable misconduct, the Court required a sexually harassed student to prove
51
three elements: (1) that there was an “appropriate person” with the ability to
52
take corrective action; (2) who had actual knowledge of the harassment; and (3)
53
54
who responded with deliberate indifference to that knowledge. This standard
has since been widely criticized for unfairly establishing difficult hurdles for
55
students to overcome and “unnecessarily thwart[ing] Title IX’s purpose.”
B. Peer Harassment Under Title IX
One year later in 1999, the Supreme Court considered the appropriate legal
test for instances of student-on-student (or peer) sexual harassment at school. In
56
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Supreme Court found that,
“student harassment of another student may constitute discrimination under
Title IX when the funding recipient engages in harassment directly or when the
57
funding recipient’s deliberate indifference subjects its students to harassment.”
Based on Gebser-like reasoning, not only did the Supreme Court apply the three
required elements discussed in Gebser, but also further required that (1) the
school exercise substantial control over both the harasser and the context in
58
which the known harassment occurs; and (2) that the sexual harassment in
59
60
question be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprives

51. Gebser did not discuss who might be an "appropriate person" to institute corrective measures for purposes of Title IX liability for the school district. See Baynard v. Lawson, 112 F. Supp. 2d
524, 532 (E.D. Va. 2000); see also Warren v. Reading Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d 163, 174 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that although a principal is an "appropriate person" in a teacher on student sexual abuse case, a
guidance counselor, on the facts before the Warren court, was not).
52. "Actual knowledge" is based on the proposition that it would not make sense to take away a
school's federal funding if the school district did not know about the discrimination, and therefore,
did not have the opportunity to cure it. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287.
53. "Deliberate indifference" occurs "only where the [school district]'s response to the harassment . . . is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645, 648-49 (1999) (emphasis added). A school district need not remedy sexual
harassment with a student's particular remedial demand or assure that students conform their conduct to school rules, but only to establish that it responded to the "known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable." See Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 260
(6th Cir. 2000) (quoting in part Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-49); see also Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago
Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 825 (7th Cir. 2003). In taking an appropriate response, a
school district may consider administrative burdens or the disruption of other students' or their
teachers' schedules. See Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 825.
54. See Green, 298 F. Supp. at 1032 (outlining three factors) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277).
55. See Cohen, supra note 46, at 315.
56. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
57. Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-448-JD, 2001 WL 276975, at *4 (D.N.H.
Mar. 21, 2001) (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-45).
58. Davis, 526 U.S. at 651-52. Misconduct that occurs during school hours and on school
grounds satisfies this prong. See id. at 652.
59. Davis, and most subsequent case law suggest that a single act of harassment, no matter how
severe, cannot meet this standard. See id. at 652-53; Wilson v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 144 F.
Supp. 2d 690, 692 (E.D. Tex. 2001); Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). But see Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CIV. A 3:01-CV-1092-R, 2002 WL
1592694, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2002) (finding that one instance of forced manual invasion of student's vagina by another student qualifies as sufficiently severe peer sexual harassment under Title
IX).
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victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the
61
school. The Court emphasized, moreover, that “[d]amages are not available for
simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children, even where
62
these comments target differences in gender.” Thus, an arguably even higher
bar was set for holding a school liable for money damages under Title IX for
63
instances of peer sexual harassment.
C. A Statutory Precursor?: Same-Sex Harassment Under Title VII
Around this same time, the Supreme Court decided a same-sex harassment
64
case in the employment context under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

60. Whether conduct is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive turns on at least eight
factors including: (1) the degree to which the conduct affected one or more students' education; (2)
the type, frequency, and duration of the conduct; (3) the identity of and relationship between the
alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of harassment; (4) the number of individuals involved;
(5) the age and sex of the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of harassment; (6) the size of
the school, location of the incidents, and context in which they occurred; (7) other incidents at school;
and (8) incidents of gender-based, but nonsexual harassment. See REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE, supra note 17, at 5-7.
61. Davis, 526 U.S. at 651. "[D]epriving victims of access to educational opportunities," does not
mean that physical exclusion needs to be established, but such language does limit private damages
to "cases having a systemic effect on educational programs or activities." Id. at 651, 653. Other courts
seem to have further limited this type of liability under Title IX to instances where harassed students
have dropped grades, become homebound or hospitalized, or suffered physical violence. See Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 823 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting
cases); Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2000) (documenting severe physical and verbal abuse of German female student); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F.
Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (physical violence against perceived homosexual student). But
see Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 828-29 (Rovner, J., concurring in part) (arguing that psychological trauma
can equally deny a student access to educational opportunities and that future victims of harassment
should not be punished just because they seem resilient); see also Ray, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1171 (although physical violence deprived victim of access to education opportunities, court also found
causing severe emotional trauma to a student could deny them access to an education).
62. Davis, 526 U.S. at 652. It also appears that courts are less likely to find actionable harassment if the harassing conduct is merely verbal, see Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 303, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 917, 930 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (collecting cases), or where the harassing conduct is between young
children who are not aware of the sexual nature of their actions. See Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 821-22.
But see Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 826 (Rovner, J., concurring in part) ("Harassing conduct need not be
motivated by sexual desire, nor must it be overtly sexual in nature, in order to support a claim of sex
discrimination."); Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1098 n.4 (D. Minn.
2000) ("[W]hile ordinary teasing is insufficiently severe to state a claim under [Title IX], the kind of
sexually-oriented physical touching that plaintiff experienced is.").
63. According to the Supreme Court, this higher standard was necessary "to eliminate any risk
that [the funding] recipient would be liable in damages not for its own official decision" but instead
for another's "independent actions." See Davis, 526 U.S. at 642-43; see also Snelling v. Fall Mountain
Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-448-JD, 2001 WL 276975, at *5 (D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2001); Horner & Norman, supra note 10, at 379. Nevertheless, one element of the test—the "appropriate person" prong—
may be easier to meet in the peer harassment environment than the teacher harassment context.
This is because "a principal's authority in the context of student on student harassment is much
greater than her authority in the context of teacher on student harassment." See Baynard v. Lawson,
112 F. Supp. 2d 524, 534 (E.D. Va. 2000) (citing Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d
1248 (10th Cir. 1999)).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2003). Title VII prohibits, inter alia, discrimination "because of
sex" in employment. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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65

In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court found, “that
nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’
merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person acting on behalf of
66
the defendant) are of the same-sex.” More specifically, the Supreme Court
indicated that one way that a Title VII claimant could establish harassment
“because of sex” in the employment arena was to show that he or she was
harassed in such sex-specific terms as to raise an inference of hostility toward
67
his or her sex. Moreover, in a previous Title VII sexual harassment case, Price
68
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court had made clear that discrimination or
harassment based on a failure to meet stereotypical gender expectations is
69
actionable under Title VII. Significantly, the Court recognized that these types
of same-sex harassment claims were not based on any sexual desire or attraction
toward the harassed individual, but rather on hostility based upon the failure of
70
the victim to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity.

65. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
66. Id. at 79. The Oncale Court went on to say that, "[w]hether gender-oriented conduct rises to
the level of actionable 'harassment' . . . depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships." Id. at 82. Indeed, in any sexual harassment case, the crucial
question is "whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Id. at 80.
67. Id. at 81.
68. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
69. See id. at 251 ("In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes.") (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 (1978)); see also Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001)
(same-sex harassment claim based on a failure to conform to gender stereotypes found actionable
under Title VII); Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090, 1092 (D. Minn.
2000) (although Title IX does not cover sexual orientation discrimination, a same-sex harassment
claim may be brought based on sexual stereotyping); REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra
note 17, at v ("[I]t can be discrimination on the basis of sex to harass a student on the basis of the victim's failure to conform to stereotyped notions of masculinity or femininity.").
70. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874 ("At its essence, the systematic abuse directed at [plaintiff]
reflected a belief that [plaintiff] did not act as a man should act."); REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE, supra note 17, at v ("[G]ender-based harassment, including that predicated on sexstereotyping, is covered by Title IX if it is sufficiently serious to deny or limit a student's ability to
participate in or benefit from the program."). That being said, offensive behavior must be based on
sex, rather than personal animus or other reasons. See Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 303,
213 F. Supp. 2d 917, 930 (C.D. Ill. 2002). If male students direct offensive behavior at both female
and male students, the court is less likely to consider such "equal opportunity" harassing behavior
gender-based sexual harassment. See id. at 931. For a more in-depth discussion about the distinction
between "desire" sexual harassment and "animus" sexual harassment, see generally Marianne C.
DelPo, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Same-Sex Hostile-Environment Sexual Harassment, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1999); Martin J. Katz, Reconsidering Attraction in Sexual Harassment, 79 IND.
L.J. 101 (2004); David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual
Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (2002).
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D. The Present Status of Same-Sex Harassment Claims Under Title IX
Although the Supreme Court in the Title IX context has not addressed
71
same-sex harassment claims, there is every reason to believe that the teachings
72
of Oncale will be incorporated into the educational setting. First, with the
exception of vicarious liability discussed above, the Supreme Court and other
federal courts have generally incorporated Title VII sexual harassment legal
73
standards into Title IX cases. Second, the lower federal courts, state courts, and
United States Department of Education have all considered the question of
same-sex harassment under Title IX and have unanimously concluded that such
74
claims are equally viable under Title IX as they are under Title VII.
Nonetheless, most current same-sex harassment cases appear to involve
sexual abuse or assaults rather than the more everyday, traditional bullying
behavior with which most people are familiar, i.e., verbal taunting and/or less
severe physical harassment or abuse based on the failure of a student to live up
75
to stereotypical gender expectations. For instance, although there are Title IX
76
cases in which male students were sexually molested by male teachers, in
which male and female students were sexually abused by other students of their

71. On the other hand, there is a general consensus among commentators that Title IX clearly
does not cover claims of sexual orientation discrimination. See, e.g., Feiock, supra note 23, at 322;
Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Sheldon Elliott Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics' Unique Environment for
Sexual Harassment Claims: Balancing the Realities of Athletics with Preventing Potential Claims, 13 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 173, 183 n.53 (2003).
72. Accord Mayes, supra note 23, at 642, 650-51.
73. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (holding that Title VII
jurisprudence provides guidance for interpretation of Title IX); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods.,
Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995) (Title VII may be used by analogy in the context of Title IX
claims); Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 ("[N]o logical rationale appears to exist for
distinguishing Title VII and Title IX in connection with . . . the circumstances under which abusive or
offensive conduct amounts to harassment 'based on sex.'").
74. See, e.g., Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 220 (5th Cir. 1998) (same-sex
harassment claim recognized under Title IX where third grade male teacher molested several male
students); Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-448-JD, 2001 WL 276975, at *4
(D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2001) (recognizing that peer harassment arising from the student perpetrators'
stereotypes of masculinity is actionable under Title IX); Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067,
1077-78 (D. Nev. 2001) (assuming availability of same-sex peer harassment suit under Title IX while
discussing punitive damages in such an action); Vaird v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. CIV. A. 99-2727,
2000 WL 576441, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000) (recognizing same-sex harassment claim between two
second grade female students); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (finding that same-sex harassment is a form of harassment actionable under Title IX in
peer harassment context); Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (recognizing peer same-sex
harassment based on perceived homosexuality of victim); H.M. and M.M. v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 719 So. 2d 793, 795 (Ala. 1998) ("We believe that the Supreme Court's Oncale definition of
'discrimination on the basis of sex' demonstrates that same-sex harassment may constitute
discrimination on the basis of sex and that such discrimination is, therefore, actionable under Title
IX, provided, of course, a plaintiff proves the remaining statutory factors."); REVISED SEXUAL
HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 17, at 3 (citing as an example of illegal same-sex harassment a
campaign of sexually explicit graffiti directed at a particular girl by other girls).
75. See Michele Goodwin, Symposium, Sex, Theory, & Practice: Reconciling Davis v. Monroe &
The Harms Caused By Children, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 822 (2002) (suggesting that bullying is more
often interpreted as a more aggressive or larger young male dominating the weaker male).
76. See H.M. and M.M., 719 So. 2d at 794.
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77

own gender, or in which male or female students were sexually abused by
78
other students based on their perceived, or actual, sexual orientation, there is
but one case which could be located based on a bullying scenario that did not
79
involve sexual abuse or sexual assault. In the special education context, only
one case was located that involved same-sex harassment and that case involved
80
a sexual assault.
E. Are Bullied Special Education Children Any Better Off Than Their Regular
Education Classmates?
In short, and problematically, few courts have actually found actionable
same-sex harassment in cases under Title IX in which either a regular education
or special education child is subject to severe, pervasive, or objectively offensive
81
bullying without some form of sexually-oriented assault being alleged. This
current situation suggests that potential plaintiffs have analyzed the high
threshold requirements for a peer sexual harassment claim, and contrary to Justice Kennedy’s prediction in Davis of an “avalanche of liability” from this type of
82
litigation, have hesitated to bring Title IX peer sexual harassment cases that do
83
not involve some form of severe, and usually criminal, sexual abuse. This is
certainly an unjust state of affairs, as a student should not have to await a crimi-

77. See KF's Father v. Marriott, No. CA 00-0215-C, 2001 WL 228353, at *2-3, *8 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 23,
2001) (same-sex sexual assault between two elementary school females); Vaird, 2000 WL 576441, at *1
n.2 (female second grade student sexually assaulted another second grade female student).
78. See Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d. 869, 879-880 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (Title
IX claim survived summary judgment in case in which male student who advocated gay rights was
physically and verbally abused by fellow male classmates based on perceived homosexuality); Ray,
107 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (Title IX suit allowed to proceed where verbal same-sex harassment against
middle school student based on perceived homosexuality escalated into assault and battery by fellow male student).
79. See Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, at *2 (small male high school student taunted regularly by
male classmates and subject to physical abuse when repeatedly hit in the head by a basketball until
he was treated at a hospital for dizziness, blurred vision, and headache).
80. See Wilson v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 144 F. Supp. 2d 690, 691 (E.D. Tex. 2001). Citing
Davis, the Wilson Court concluded that "[d]amages are not available for simple acts of teasing and
name-calling among school children . . . even when such comments target differences in gender." Id.
at 694 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 651-52). The Wilson case thus seems to suggest that bullying, teasing, and name-calling alone, no matter how severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, cannot lead
to damages under Title IX. Not only is such a view unsupported by current Supreme Court case law
and by the Department of Education, see supra note 74 and accompanying text, but the court's language gives further evidence of the need for an alternative damage action for harassed and bullied
special education child utilizing IDEA-based remedies. See infra Parts IV and VI.
81. See Gigi Rollini, Notes & Comments, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education: A Hollow
Victory for Student Victims of Peer Sexual Harassment, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 987, 995 (2003) (observing
that the only victims of peer sexual harassment who succeed under Davis are students "utterly
debilitated by the harassment.").
82. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Cohen, supra note 46, at 317 (arguing that the unsubstantiated fear of the Gebser and Davis Courts that federal courts would be deluged
with Title IX sexual harassment lawsuits motivated the Supreme Court to deviate from common
principles of statutory interpretation).
83. See supra Part II. D; see also Rollini, supra note 81, at 988 n. 1 (noting that, as of 2003, there
have only been two successful peer sexual harassment cases under Title IX since Davis and this fact
shows how severe the harassing conduct must be for one to be entitled to relief under Title IX).
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nal attack on his or her person at school before being entitled to some form of
84
civil relief. In short, the current Title IX peer sexual harassment framework is
so narrow that it is entirely ineffective in addressing the very serious and real
issue of bullying of children at school based on their failure to conform to stereo85
typical notions of gender.
Although the situation remains bleak for regular education children who
are bullied at school, it is unnecessary for bullied special education children to
suffer the same “normal part of growing up.” The remaining sections of this
article consider the added civil rights afforded to special education children
under the IDEA special education law, and then subsequently explore two
separate IDEA-based approaches for increasing the legal protection afforded to
special education children who are bullied.
III. IDEA AND THE BULLYING OF SPECIAL EDUCATION CHILDREN
86

The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) guarantees a
87
88
free and appropriate education (FAPE) to all children with disabilities. To

84. The Supreme Court itself noted as much in the Title VII context when it said that a sexually
harassed female at work should not have to suffer a nervous breakdown before she is eligible for
relief under Title VII. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). Accord Gabrielle M.
v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 828-29 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rovner, J.,
concurring) (applying the teachings of Harris to the Title IX peer harassment context and arguing
that "a hostile environment [at school] should be actionable before it results in consequences so dramatic as hospitalization or leaving school.").
85. Some members of Congress have seemed to recognize as much by recently introducing
legislation that would overturn the Gebser and Davis decisions. See Cohen, supra note 46, at 315 n.21
(citing H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. §§ 111-14 (2004)); see also Horner & Norman, supra note 10, at 381
(arguing that some commentators believe that the current state of school violence law, including
Title IX, gives little incentive to school districts to protect their students from violence); Mayes, supra
note 23, at 646-647 (arguing that the Davis standard for peer sexual harassment cases has effectively
limited successful suits); Meghan E. Cherner-Ranft, Comments, The Empty Promises of Title IX: Why
Girls Need Courts to Reconsider Liability Standards and Preemption in School Sexual Harassment Cases, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1891, 1895 (2003) (arguing that Title IX does not provide meaningful relief for
sexually harassed female students).
86. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000). The enactment of IDEA led to sweeping changes in the
education of special needs children. It brought into the public schools more than one million
children with disabilities who had been previously excluded or had received only limited
educational services.
See EDITORIAL PROJECTS IN EDUCATION, SPECIAL EDUCATION, at
http://www.edweek.org/context/topics/issuespage.cfm?id=63 (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). IDEA
currently is estimated to cover 6.7 million students or about 14% of the public school student
population. See supra note 29. Recently, Congress reauthorized the IDEA statute. See 20 U.S.C. §
1400 (2005). This reauthorization has been described as intending to “mandate quality standards for
special education teachers, streamline disciplinary actions involving students with disabilities, and
… reduce the number of lawsuits stemming from the statute.” See Erik W. Robelen & Christina
Samuels, Congress Passes IDEA Reauthorization, EDWEEK.ORG November 22, 2004, at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2004/11/22/13idea_web.h24.html (registration required).
None of these statutory changes, however, should change this article's legal analysis.
87. A "free and appropriate education" means special education and related services that "(A)
have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity
with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title." 20 U.S.C. §
1401(8)(A)-(D). See also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982) (holding that an inquiry
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ensure that these children have access to a FAPE, IDEA requires states and local
89
school districts that receive federal funding for special education and related
90
91
services to meet certain procedural safeguards. These procedural safeguards
are aimed at providing parents of special education children with meaningful
92
input into decisions that affect their child’s education. For example, IDEA
requires that a school district provide prior written notice to parents whenever
the school district proposes (or refuses) to change a child’s placement or
93
program, and that the school place, “to the maximum extent appropriate,” a
94
special education child in the least restrictive environment (LRE). IDEA also

into whether a FAPE has been provided depends on whether the school has adequately complied
with procedures set forth in IDEA and whether the individual education plan is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits).
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). A "child with a disability" means a child "with mental retardation,
hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments
(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic
brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and who, by reason thereof,
needs special education and related services." Id. § 1401(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
89. "Special education" means "specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the
unique needs of a child with a disability, including - (A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in
the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and (B) instruction in physical education." Id. § 1401(25)(A)-(B).
90. "Related services" refers to "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services (including speech-language pathology and audiology services, psychological
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work
services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services,
and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education,
and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children." Id. §
1401(22). See also Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 890 (1984) (establishing a two part
test for determining whether a particular service is considered a related service under IDEA).
91. 20 U.S.C. §1415(a). Like Title IX, Congress enacted IDEA under its Spending Clause authority and federal funding recipients are bound to conditions that Congress attaches to these grants. See
Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 2002). Unlike Title IX, a private right of
action with specific remedies and exhaustion provisions are expressly written into IDEA. See 20
U.S.C. § 1415(l) (exhaustion provision). For a comprehensive discussion of IDEA's exhaustion provision, see infra Part V.A.2.
92. See Frazier, 276 F.3d at 58 (outlining the various procedural protections that IDEA affords to
parents).
93. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b).
94. See id. § 1412(a)(5). "Least restrictive environment" means: "To the maximum extent
appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other
care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment
occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." Id. §
1412(a)(5)(A). Placing special education children in the regular classroom is also referred to as
"mainstreaming," and reduces social stigmatization, while increasing other non-academic benefits
for that child. See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994);
Hoffman v. East Troy Cmty. Sch. Dist., 38 F. Supp. 750, 766 n.5 (E.D. Wis. 1999). Indeed, and
probably because of IDEA's impact, most special education students spend the majority of their time
in the regular classroom with non-disabled students. See EDITORIAL PROJECTS IN EDUCATION,
SPECIAL EDUCATION, at http://www.edweek.org/context/topics/issuespage.cfm?id=63 (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004).
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requires schools to keep track of a special education student’s placement and
95
programs through use of a written individual education plan (IEP).
If a parent of a special education child believes that their child’s rights
under IDEA have been violated, IDEA permits parents to file formal complaints
“with respect to any manner relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free and appropriate
96
education to such child.” A complaint may be presented at a formal due
process hearing, presided over by an impartial due process hearing officer
97
appointed by either the state or local educational agency. The due process
officer may award various injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief for
98
violations of IDEA. Such monetary relief may take the form of compensatory
99
100
education and tuition reimbursement, but generally does not result in money
101
damages. Either the parent of the special education child or the school district
may appeal the due process officer’s decision to a state or federal court if they
102
are unhappy with the outcome.
Thus, when either a special or regular education child subjects a special
education child to bullying, at least two IDEA provisions are potentially implicated and must be considered. First, if a school fails to respond to bullying of a
special education child and, as a result, the child’s right to a free and appropriate education is violated, the parents of that special education child can bring a
103
claim under IDEA. Second, if a school reacts to the bullying of a special educa-

95. An "individual education plan" or "IEP" is defined as a "written statement for each child
with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with section 1414(d) of this
title." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(11); see also id. § 1414(d) (outlining the specific requirements the IEP must satisfy).
96. Id. § 1415(b)(6).
97. Id. § 1415(f)-(g). Many states also provide access to a mediation process through which parents of special education children and school districts can mediate their disputes and come to a mutually acceptable resolution of their dispute without having to participate in the due process hearing.
See Frazier, 276 F.3d at 58-59.
98. See Frazier, 276 F.3d at 59 (collecting cases); THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & KATH KLARE, SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAW 203, 207 (2d ed. 2001).
99. See M.C. v. Central Reg'l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 395 (3d Cir. 1996) (compensatory education
covers the time child was deprived of FAPE).
100. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370-71 (1985) (parents are entitled to tuition reimbursement for unilateral private placements when the placement was necessary
for child to receive a FAPE); see also 34 C.F.R § 300.403(c) (1999).
101. Absent egregious due process violations or endangerment of a child's health, general monetary damages are unavailable under IDEA. See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 98, at 211 (collecting
cases); see also O.F. v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 246 F. Supp. 2d 409, 419 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("[A]n
award of monetary damages to compensate a plaintiff for an IDEA violation is an extraordinary
remedy."). As one prominent jurist has observed, this state of affairs is "the norm for social-welfare
programs that specify benefits in kind at public expense, whether medical care or housing or, under
the IDEA, education." Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.).
Even so, monetary damages may be available under an IDEA-based § 1983 cause of action. See infra
Part V.C.
102. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). As will be discussed in more detail below in Part V.A.2, an
aggrieved party, in most cases, must satisfy the IDEA's exhaustion provisions before bringing their
case to state or federal court. See id. § 1415(l).
103. See Weber, Disability Harassment, supra note 26, at 1110 (noting that an educational environment permeated with harassment is hardly conducive to a special education child receiving a FAPE).
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tion child by moving that child out of a mainstream classroom environment,
such well-meaning actions may result in a violation of the special education
child’s right to be educated in the least restrictive environment.
In short, school administrators must consider a special education child’s
rights under IDEA when that child is subjected to bullying/same-sex
harassment at school. In a perfect world, circumspection by school officials
about a child’s IDEA rights would hopefully lead to a more appropriate
104
response to bullying behavior directed against such a child.
Practically
speaking, a special education student’s IDEA rights will inevitably be trampled
upon in bullying scenarios and it is thus important to explore potential IDEA105
based legal approaches for remedying these violations.
IV. THE FIRST PROPOSED REMEDY: STRENGTHENING TITLE IX PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ACTIONS THROUGH A HYBRID TITLE IX-IDEA FRAMEWORK
A. The Proposed Framework
As argued in Part II above, the current Title IX framework for peer samesex harassment provides little effective relief for either regular or special educa106
tion children who are the subject of intolerable and constant bullying. Nevertheless, as discussed in Part III, special education children may be able to utilize
the rights granted to them under IDEA to protect themselves from unwanted
107
harassment.
For these reasons, this article proposes, for the first time, that
courts increase the legal protections available for special education children
whom are the subject of same-sex harassment/bullying at school by adopting a
hybrid Title IX-IDEA cause of action.
This hybrid legal model addresses same-sex harassment/bullying involving a special education child by requiring school districts to take into account
both Title IX and IDEA so that the child will be provided with a free and appropriate education in a discriminatory-free atmosphere in the least restrictive environment. Indeed, an appropriate legal model in this context must take into account both statutory schemes because the bullying of a special education child
108
might cause the school to violate both Title IX and IDEA. This legal state of
affairs exists because the rights granted by Title IX and IDEA set forth an overlapping lattice of statutory obligations. It is therefore easier to conceive of a
school district’s legal obligations in the special education bullying context by
blending the two statutory frameworks together into one coherent hybrid legal
cause of action.

104. See Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar: Section 1983 Damage Claims in Special Education
Lawsuits, 36 GA. L. REV. 465, 535 (2002) (observing that some commentators believe that the mere
threat of damages under IDEA will compel "recalcitrant school systems" to better protect special
education children) [hereinafter Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar].
105. See Weber, Disability Harassment, supra note 26, at 1122-1123 ("Perhaps monetary awards can
never make a person whole for humiliation or insult, but in our society damages are the ordinary
means for compensating a person for all past wrongs, including those that entail emotional injury.").
106. See supra note 85 and accompanying notes.
107. See supra note 103 and accompanying notes.
108. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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This synthesis of Title IX and IDEA legal standards is made somewhat
easier by the fact that the current Title IX framework contains a number of
vague and ambiguous legal standards prone to further elaboration. For
instance, the Davis test requires that a student establish that a school official who
had the authority to take corrective action, had actual knowledge about a case of
peer sexual harassment, but nevertheless was deliberately indifferent to such
109
knowledge.
Deliberate indifference in the Title IX context has subsequently
been defined to mean that the school official has acted in a “clearly
110
unreasonable” manner in light of the known circumstances.
Because the
“clearly unreasonable” standard is somewhat vague and is susceptible to further
definition, IDEA is able to endow Title IX with more substance by consideration
of IDEA’s implications for describing what constitutes a “clearly unreasonable”
response to bullying in the special education context.
Although under Davis students are not entitled to any particular remedial
111
demand, the Davis Court was also clear in establishing that when deciding
whether a school district’s response to known harassment was clearly unreasonable, a court must consider this question “in the light of the known circum112
stances.” In the special education context, the “known circumstances” include
the school district’s knowledge that special education children must be ensured
under federal law a FAPE in the least restrictive environment. Thus, combining
this part of the Title IX framework with a child’s recognized rights under IDEA,
the hybrid Title IX-IDEA cause of action requires courts to hold schools liable if
the school’s response to the known harassment was clearly unreasonable in light
of its obligations under Title IX and IDEA.
Another part of the Davis test that can be modified under this hybrid legal
standard is the requirement that peer harassment at school must be so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprives a student of access to the
113
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school. In determining
what constitutes an actionable deprivation of educational opportunities and
benefits in the special education context, a court needs to consider what
educational opportunities and benefits special education students are entitled to
under IDEA. Although courts since Davis appear to have restricted this
showing to instances where harassed students have dropped grades, become
114
homebound or hospitalized, or suffered physical violence, what constitutes
“educational opportunities and benefits” for a regular education child is
different than what constitutes such opportunities and benefits for a special
education child under IDEA. To reiterate, this is because a special education
child under IDEA is entitled to a free and appropriate education, including the
provision of special education and related services, in the least restrictive
115
environment.
By incorporating these IDEA rights into this part of the Davis

109. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 650.
114. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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framework, courts will know to ask if the bullied special education student is
denied a free and appropriate education in the least restrictive environment or
otherwise denied access to appropriate educational opportunities and benefits
as a result of the bullying/harassment.
B. Applying the Hybrid Framework to a Recently Decided Case
To be more concrete about how this hybrid test would work in practice,
116
consider the actual case of Wilson v. Independent School District. In this case, a
mildly mentally disabled middle school student named Ken Wilson alleged that
he had been sexually molested and harassed by a fellow male mentally disabled
117
classmate, referred to in the case as “John Doe.” By the time of the summary
judgment motion filed by the defendant school district, the evidence established
that Doe had repeatedly bullied and picked on Wilson over a number of years
and, as a result, their teacher had assigned them separate seats in the classroom
118
and on the school bus. Additionally, on one occasion, an incident occurred in
which Doe allegedly sexually molested Wilson while they were alone in the
119
boys’ rest room. There was, however, a factual dispute about whether or not
120
there had actually been sexual contact between the boys during this incident.
121
Initially, the school neither reacted to the incident, nor notified Wilson’s
122
parents of the incident.
Three days later, Wilson told his sister that he had
123
been sexually molested by Doe and, in turn, his sister told their parents. The
Wilsons thereafter reported the conduct to state authorities, the police, and the
124
principal, and Doe was subsequently transferred to another school.
The Wilsons later filed a Title IX claim on behalf of their son for peer sexual
harassment for the school’s initial lack of action in response to the sexual
125
Under the Davis test, the district court granted summary
molestation.
judgment to the school district, finding that the school was not deliberately
indifferent in its initial response to the assault and that, in any event, the alleged
116. 144 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Tex. 2001). This case was chosen out of necessity as there are only
a few cases reported where a special education child has been subject to either bullying or other
forms of peer sexual harassment. See, e.g., Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238,
1242-43 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that special education female high school student had stated a claim
upon which relief could granted when she alleged that she had been sexually molested by a fellow
male special education student); Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 47, 194 F. Supp. 2d 939, 940 (D.
Minn. 2002) (granting summary judgment against special needs female high school student subject
to verbal harassment by members of both sexes). This might be because of the current difficulty of
bringing successful peer sexual harassment cases since Davis, see supra note 84, or because special
education students and their parents have not fully appreciated the additional protections that IDEA
might supply in these circumstances.
117. See Wilson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 690-91.
118. Id. at 691.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Nevertheless, the teacher continued to separate the boys in the classroom after the boys'
restroom incident. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 692.
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physical sexual conduct was not sufficiently severe to deprive Wilson of access
126
to educational opportunities and benefits. The court based its analysis on the
fact that the school district’s initial lack of response was based on its belief that
there had been no sexual contact and that in light of this belief, their actions
127
were not clearly unreasonable.
Regardless of whether the Wilson court was right or wrong in granting
summary judgment, a proper consideration of Wilson’s IDEA rights under a
hybrid Title IX-IDEA legal model would have provided additional legal protections to Wilson under the circumstances. At the very least, with factual disputes
much harder to ignore, Wilson would have been able to bring his tale to trial so
that a jury of his peers could consider whether the repeated bullying he suffered, in conjunction with the sexual assault, interfered with his receiving a
128
FAPE in the least restrictive environment under the circumstances. Although
by no means a “slam dunk” case, the proposed hybrid legal standard would
have enhanced Wilson’s civil rights protections and increased the likelihood of
him being either successful on the merits or gaining a favorable settlement of his
claims. Additionally, the mere increased attention to the school’s IDEA obligations in such same-sex harassment/bullying scenarios may have given the
school district extra incentive to take more aggressive action against Doe’s bully129
ing behavior, before his actions escalated into a sexual assault against Wilson.
In sum, when a special education child is the object of same-sex
harassment/bullying, the legal rights of that child should be enlarged by the
operation of IDEA. Accordingly, this article proposes the following four-prong
test for instances of peer sexual harassment/bullying in the special education
130
context: a school is liable for the same-sex harassment of a special education
child where: (1) the school had actual notice of the harassment; (2) the character

126. Id. at 693-696.
127. Id. In coming to these conclusions, the court appears to make at least two legal errors. First,
the court accepted the school's version of events in finding that the school was initially unaware that
there had been sexual contact and therefore, their actions were not clearly unreasonable. Id. at 693.
Under a summary judgment legal posture, however, a court should view all evidence in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See id. at 692 (citing Lemelle v. Universal Mfg.
Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994)). Second, the court wrongly cited the Davis opinion for the
proposition that one incident of sexual harassment can never be sufficiently severe. Id. at 695. The
Davis Court merely said in this regard that "it is unlikely" for one instance of harassment to meet the
standard, but that "in theory, a single instance of sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment"
could suffice. Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53 (emphasis added).
128. The Wilson Court had inappropriately analyzed the prior bullying episodes separately from
the sexual assault, as if the former chain of events was unconnected to the latter. Wilson, 144 F.
Supp. 2d at 694-95. The key advantage to this hybrid test is that it would force courts to look at the
bullying incidents and the sexual assault together to determine its overall impact on the special education student's rights under IDEA.
129. For instance, the bullying and teasing alone could have led the school to transfer the harassing student to another class, suspend him, curtail his school privileges, or provide additional supervision, before the sexual assault ever occurred. See Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186
F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999).
130. This test assumes the Supreme Court will eventually incorporate Oncale's same-sex harassment standards from the Title VII context into the Title IX context. In the meantime, lower courts
and the Department of Education have been applying Oncale's lessons to the Title IX context. See
supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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of the harassment was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive; (3) the
school’s response to the known harassment was clearly unreasonable in light of
its obligations under Title IX and IDEA; and (4) the student was denied a free
and appropriate education in the least restrictive environment or otherwise
denied access to appropriate educational opportunities and benefits as a result
131
of the harassment.
By bolstering the Davis Title IX framework in this manner, courts will be
taking a significant step in the direction of fulfilling Title IX and IDEA’s dual
promise of protecting special education children from the very real and longterm consequences associated with bullying. As a result, schools will be more
welcoming places for special education children.
V. THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
LIMITATIONS ON POSSIBLE § 1983 ACTIONS FOR MONEY DAMAGES
Of course, for reasons discussed in Part II, and because a more sympathetic
hybrid Title IX-IDEA model like the one proposed in Part IV may not be
available, Title IX relief for bullied special education children may be very hard
to come by. Additionally, under its Title IX jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has clearly indicated that a sexual harassment claim can only be brought against
132
a school district. It is thus important to consider whether alternative relief for
bullying victims may nevertheless be available against other parties. This Part
proceeds to examine other possible legal remedies for bullied special education
children under § 1983, the primary federal civil rights law. Unfortunately,
procedural and substantive limitations render § 1983 claims based on Title IX,
equal protection, and due process unlikely to provide much real legal relief. As
a result, and as discussed more fully in Part VI, a § 1983 claim based on IDEA
seems the most probable § 1983 claim to offer legal hope to bullied special
education children.
A. An Overview of § 1983
One possible way to hold individual supervisory school officials liable for
permitting same-sex harassment/bullying is to pursue a civil rights claim under
133
§ 1983. Although § 1983 does not itself supply any substantive rights to a civil
134
rights plaintiff, it does provide a procedural vehicle for bringing federal consti-

131. The factor concerning appropriate control over the harasser and the context in which the
harassment takes place is assumed to be met in the in-school bullying scenario with which this article is primarily concerned, and therefore, does not appear as a separate factor in the hybrid Title IXIDEA proposed standard.
132. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 640. This limitation results from the fact that Title IX only imposes obligations on the funding recipient, not individuals working for the recipient or under the recipient's
supervision. Id.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). § 1983 states: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Id.
134. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
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tutional or statutory claims against an individual acting in an official manner
136
under color of state law. More specifically, a civil rights plaintiff under § 1983
may have a private right of action for equitable and compensatory relief against
137
a state actor who deprives him or her of a constitutional right (e.g., due process or equal protection rights) or other federal right (e.g., Title IX or IDEA
138
rights).
The § 1983 cause of action may be more appealing than a Title IX action
because it potentially permits a student plaintiff to seek money damages from
supervisory school officials responsible for permitting the bullying in question
139
to continue.
Moreover, whereas Title IX requires “actual knowledge” and
“deliberate indifference” on the part of a school official with the ability to take
140
corrective action, some courts and commentators believe that § 1983 may
141
require a less burdensome showing.
These advantages aside, there are some important procedural and
substantive limitations on § 1983 causes of action that must be more fully
discussed before its usefulness to bullying victims can be fully assessed.
B. Procedural Limitations on § 1983 Actions for Bullying
Section 1983’s availability for bullying situations is limited potentially by
two procedural doctrines: statutory preemption and administrative exhaustion.

135. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (permitting a plaintiff to bring a §
1983 action based on an alleged violation of federal statutory law). Although § 1983 claims can also
be brought against institutions acting under color of state law or individuals acting in their official
capacity, see Monnell v. Dept. of Sch. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), such claims are limited to
situations where a plaintiff proves a causal link between the institutional policy or custom of the
state entity and the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 694. Because it is unlikely that school districts will have
an institutional policy or custom of permitting or ignoring peer sexual harassment, this article's
analysis of § 1983 is limited to claims against school officials in their individual capacities.
136. In the public school context, an individual acting under color of state law may include officials or employees of a public school system. See Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 57-58
(1st Cir. 2002). Private school officials would not qualify as officials acting under color of state law,
and therefore, § 1983 claims are not available in the private school context. See Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-844 (1982).
137. "Under color of state law" in § 1983 has been interpreted to be synonymous with "state
actor." See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982).
138. See Cherner-Ranft, supra note 85, at 1911.
139. See Michael A. Zwibelman, Comment, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (1998).
140. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650-52.
141. The standard for supervisory liability under § 1983 is quite unsettled. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 724 (3d Cir. 1989) ("reckless indifference"); Lipsett v. Univ. of
Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 914 (1st Cir. 1988) ("gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference"); but see Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994) ("deliberate indifference"); Gates v. Unified Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir. 1993) (same). Although one commentator has suggested that the "gross negligence" standard most accurately reflects the test most
courts apply in these types of cases, see Zwibelman, supra note 139, at 1484, recent case law suggests
that the standard is actually closer to the deliberate indifference standard utilized in Title IX sexual
harassment cases. See Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003).
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1. Statutory Preemption Analysis
Following the Supreme Court case of Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
142
National Sea Clammers Association, when a § 1983 claim is based on a violation
of a federal statute, courts refuse to allow a plaintiff to bring a statutory-based
§ 1983 claim where the statute itself provides a sufficiently comprehensive
143
scheme for relief (the “Sea Clammers” doctrine). In other words, in cases in
which a plaintiff alleges simultaneously a cause of action under a comprehensive statutory scheme and a cause of action under § 1983 based solely on that
144
same statute, the statutory scheme in question preempts the § 1983 claim.
Additionally, a different test has been articulated by the Supreme Court for
an instance in which a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim based on a constitutional
provision that conflicts with a statutory remedial scheme. Under Smith v. Robin145
son, and unlike the Sea Clammers doctrine, the emphasis is on whether the
§ 1983 constitutional claim is “virtually identical” to the rights contained in the
statutory scheme and whether Congress intended the statute to be the “exclu146
sive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert those claims.”
The question, of course, is what statutory remedial schemes fall within
these preemption doctrines. The courts that have considered this question with
regard to Title IX have split fairly evenly on whether or not Title IX is such a
comprehensive statute that it preempts § 1983 constitutional and statutory
147
claims. At least one commentator has argued that the trend is to hold that Ti148
tle IX preempts both statutory and constitutional claims brought under § 1983.
Consequently, a bullied child wishing to hold a principal or teacher responsible
for not sufficiently protecting them from same-sex harassment/bullying may

142. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
143. Id. at 20.
144. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one such example. See Arrington v. Cobb County,
139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Of course, an allegation of a Title VII violation cannot provide the
sole basis for a§ 1983 claim.") (citing Allen v. Denver Pub. Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 982 (10th Cir. 1991);
Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223, 1233 (8th Cir. 1986)).
145. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
146. Id. at 1009. Interestingly enough, Smith was decided under IDEA's predecessor statute. As
discussed below, however, Congress legislatively overruled Smith as part of the 1986 amendments to
the predecessor statute. See infra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
147. Compare Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999) (Title IX preempts
statutory claims for sex discrimination), Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d
Cir. 1998) (disallowing a § 1983 claim based on Title IX itself or based on constitutional provisions),
Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1996) (Title IX preempts a § 1983 claim
based on constitutional claims), and Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d
Cir. 1993) (Title IX preempts § 1983 claim based on equal protection clause), with Kinman v. Omaha
Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding Title IX claim does not preclude § 1983 claim
based on constitutional violation), Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997) (permitting
§ 1983 constitutional and statutory claim to proceed even in the face of an alleged Title IX claim),
Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding constitutional violation based on §
1983 not barred by Title IX), and Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723-24 (6th Cir.
1996) (finding Title IX does not preempt statutory and constitutionally based § 1983 claims).
148. See Cherner-Raft, supra note 85, at 1916. Another commentator has argued that lower courts
have been sloppy in distinguishing between statutory-based and constitutionally-based § 1983
claims, and even in separately analyzing different types of constitutionally-based § 1983 claims. See
Zwibelman, supra note 139, at 1471-73.
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not be able to do so under a Title IX-based § 1983 claim depending upon the circuit law that applies to their circumstances.
With regard to an IDEA-based § 1983 claim, the 1986 amendments to IDEA
reinstated plaintiffs’ ability to use § 1983 as a vehicle to vindicate a disabled
149
child’s constitutional and statutory rights. The Court in Hiller v. Board of Edu150
cation made this clear when is stated that, “section 1415(f) was enacted to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Robinson . . . holding that [IDEA’s
predecessor statute] is the exclusive remedy and § 1983 is not available [except]
151
in very limited circumstances.”
Consequently, IDEA does not preempt
§ 1983’s ability to ensure the rights of disabled children through a constitutional
152
or statutory tort action.
2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Requirement
Even if a federal statute, like Title IX, does not preempt a § 1983 claim, the
statute in question may nevertheless require a plaintiff to exhaust available
administrative remedies before permitting the plaintiff to bring a statutory claim
for money damages under § 1983 in state or federal court. Although there is not
153
an exhaustion requirement under Title IX, one does exist expressly under
IDEA. Under these exhaustion provisions, an aggrieved party must first have
154
their IDEA claims heard at an impartial due process hearing.
This requisite
not only applies for actions directly brought under IDEA, but also has been
found to “appl[y] even when the suit is brought pursuant to a different statute,”
155
such as § 1983.
Nevertheless, the exhaustion requirement is not absolute. “A plaintiff does
not have to exhaust administrative remedies if [he or] she can show . . . that the
administrative remedies afforded by the process are inadequate given the relief
156
sought.”
Importantly, the “relief sought” is not just based on whether the
149. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (1986). For a comprehensive discussion of the availability of IDEAbased § 1983 claims, see generally Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar, supra note 104.
150. 687 F. Supp. 735 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
151. Id. at 744 (citing Mrs. W v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987)).
152. See Tirozzi, 748 F.2d at 755; but see Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar, supra note 104, at 535-537
(concluding that an IDEA-based § 1983 action for money damages should generally not be permitted).
153. See Bowden v. Dever, No. CIV. A. 00-12308-DPW, 2002 WL 472293, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 20,
2002) ("[C]laims that [are] not related to 'a free, appropriate public education', such as violations of
Title IX based on alleged sexual harassment and retaliation, [are] treated separately and [are] not
subject to IDEA exhaustion.").
154. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). The pertinent part of IDEA states: "[B]efore the filing of a civil action
under [the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act or other federal laws
protecting the rights of children with disabilities] seeking relief that is also unavailable under
[IDEA], the [due process hearing] procedures . . . shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be
required had the action been brought under [IDEA]."
155. See Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 2000).
156. Rose, 214 F.3d at 210-11; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988) (finding under IDEA's
predecessor statute that "parents may bypass the administrative process where exhaustion would be
futile or inadequate"); Taylor v. Vermont Dept. of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 790 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Hence, if
plaintiffs can demonstrate that there is no relief available to them through the administrative process, they may avail themselves of the futility or inadequacy exceptions to the exhaustion requirement . . . .").
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plaintiff labels his or her relief as monetary or equitable, but whether there is
“relief for the events, condition, or consequences of which the person complains,
157
[even if] not necessarily relief of the kind the person prefers.” Thus, the critical
inquiry into whether exhaustion is futile is not whether a hearing officer has the
158
ability to grant general money damages, which he or she generally does not,
but whether there is any type of relief available under the administrative scheme
159
which would redress plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
Currently, there is a sharp split among the federal courts of appeals,
160
regarding whether exhaustion of IDEA-based § 1983 claims is necessary.
Although all courts apparently agree that the due process hearing officers
cannot grant the requested money damages under the powers granted to them
161
under IDEA, the recent trend in case law appears to require exhaustion even
162
when the sole claim is for money damages under § 1983.
This approach not
only recognizes that the hearing officer has the authority to take action in
response to the complaint (even if this remedy is not the one the plaintiff
prefers), but also preserves the state or local educational agency’s ability to
conciliate IDEA disputes short of litigation and further, facilitates the “in-kind
163
delivery of educational services” that IDEA contemplates.

157. Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 488 (2d Cir. 2002).
158. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
159. See Polera, 288 F.3d at 488.
160. Compare Taylor, 313 F.3d at 789-90 (recognizing general rule that exhaustion is normally
required for IDEA-based § 1983 claims, but finding that plaintiffs did not need to exhaust their
administrative remedies because to do so would be futile), Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 12, 297
F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 2002) (requiring IDEA exhaustion before permitting IDEA-based § 1983
action for money damages), Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding
that § 1983 claim based on violation of IDEA must be preceded by exhaustion of administrative
remedies, even if only money damages are sought), Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir.
1996) (dismissing § 1983 damage claim under IDEA for failure to exhaust administrative remedies),
and N.B. v. Alachua County. Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1996) (requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies) (per curiam), with Covington v. Knox County Sch. Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 917
(6th Cir. 2000) (permitting § 1983 claim without exhaustion of administrative remedies where
student had already graduated), Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999)
(not requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in IDEA suit), and W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484,
496 (3d Cir. 1995) (not requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in § 1983 case in which
requested relief is not available under IDEA).
161. Because parties in a special education dispute are trying to determine relative
responsibilities concerning the provision of a FAPE to a child, the most common remedies are in the
nature of injunctive or declaratory relief. See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 98, and accompanying
text. Nonetheless, hearing officers are authorized to grant damages in the form of tuition
reimbursement (when parents unilaterally place their child in a private placement because a FAPE is
not available in the public school), compensatory education (when the child needs additional
education services because of a lack of a FAPE), and in very limited circumstances, monetary
damages (the general rule though is that compensatory damages are not available under IDEA). See
supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text; see also GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 98, at 207.
162. See Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. #403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that more
common approach recently is to require exhaustion of IDEA-based § 1983 money damage actions);
see also Frazier, 276 F.3d at 61 ("Exhaustion is beneficial regardless of whether the administrative
process offers the specific form of remediation sought by a particular plaintiff."); Cudjoe, 297 F.3d at
1068 (same).
163. Even where money damages alone are sought, IDEA's administrative scheme should be
exhausted so that state or local educational agencies are able "to develop a factual record, to apply its
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In a nutshell, exhaustion of administrative remedies under IDEA is still the
general rule, and the burden is on the party seeking to avoid the exhaustion
164
requirement to show the futility of the administrative process. Given this fact
and the current split in circuit authority, the safest course presently to take as a
plaintiff alleging an IDEA-based § 1983 claim would be to file for a due process
hearing consistent with the IDEA statutory scheme and participate to the fullest
extent in the administrative proceedings, and only file a § 1983 claim in state or
165
federal court if that process does not resolve the dispute.
C. Substantive Limitations on § 1983 Actions for Bullying
As previously discussed, same-sex harassment claims for bullying based on
Title IX might be difficult to bring as a result of the high threshold set by the
166
court and the lingering issue of preemption in the § 1983 context.
Consequently, bullied students have sometimes sought relief under § 1983
against either the individual state actors who have injured them, or state actors
who have failed to take action to protect them, under the due process or equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
167
Constitution.
1. Section 1983 Due Process Analysis
Under the federal due process clause, a sexually harassed or abused
student could attempt to bring a constitutionally-based § 1983 due process
168
169
claim.
Even so, success on these grounds is highly unlikely.
This fact is
directly attributable to Supreme Court precedent which holds that there is no
affirmative obligation on a state to protect its citizens from the violent acts of
170
private individuals. Nevertheless, two exceptions exist to this general rule: (1)

expertise to the problem, to exercise its discretion, and to correct its own mistakes . . . . " Frazier, 276
F. 3d at 60 (quoting Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1989)
(discussing IDEA predecessor statute)). But see Mark C. Weber, Exile and the Kingdom: Integration,
Harassment, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 63 MD. L. REV. 162, 195 (2004) (arguing that the
plain meaning of Section 1415(l) should prevail over any administrative law policies and that
exhaustion should not be required when money damages are sought under IDEA); Weber, Disability
Harassment, supra note 26, at 1138-39 (same).
164. See Frazier, 276 F.3d at 59 (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326-27 (1988)).
165. The advantage of this course of action is that the school conduct about which the plaintiff is
complaining may be adequately addressed through a due process hearing or other informal interactions with the school district, making resort to a monetary damages action under § 1983 unnecessary.
166. See supra Parts II and V. B. 1.
167. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
168. See Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1237 (10th Cir. 1999); see
also Weber, Damages Liability, supra note 13, at 89-90.
169. But see Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar, supra note 104, at 535 (arguing that the availability of
damages for constitutional claims under § 1983 provide sufficient clout to encourage compliance
with IDEA by school officials).
170. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989).
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where a “special relationship” exists between the state and the person harmed;
or (2) where the state is responsible for the “creation of the danger” which
171
caused the person’s harm.
Even with these two exceptions, § 1983 due process cases concerning the
sexual abuse of children at school have illustrated that these legal theories of
172
recovery are largely illusory. Special relationship claims have generally been
limited to instances in which the state has involuntary control over an
individual and is responsible for his or her care, such as in the mental health or
prison context, but not in the school context (even in light of compulsory
173
education laws).
This is true even for special education children who find
themselves in residential schools or severely disabled students who are placed
174
in public schools. As far as the creation of danger exception, student plaintiffs
175
have fared only slightly better.
Courts in these cases generally find that an
affirmative act by the school is essential to this type of case, and school
176
indifference to sexual abuse generally is not sufficient to state a claim.
Of course, if a due process claim based on sexual abuse of a child does not
generally lead to § 1983 relief for the victimized child, it would seem to follow
that less severe, traditional bullying behavior would have less of a chance to
177
support a “special relationship” or “creation of danger” claim. Thus, constitutionally-based § 1983 claims relying on the due process clause do not substantially fill in the current legal void in protecting children from bullying at school.
2. Section 1983 Equal Protection Analysis
Victimized students have only fared slightly better under a constitutionally-based § 1983 claim based on an equal protection analysis. For instance, in
178
Murrell v. School District No. 1, Denver, Co., a female special education student
alleged that the school and certain school officials had failed to eradicate a hos-

171. See Maxwell v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 53 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790-92 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
172. See Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732-734 (8th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).
173. See Stevenson v. Martin County Bd. of Educ., 3 Fed. Appx. 25 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 821 (2001); Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991 (10th Cir. 1994); J.O.
v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Weber, Disability Harassment, supra note 26, at 90 & n.45; Horner & Norman, supra note 10, at 376 ("[A]ttempts to extend
[special relationship] rulings to the educational setting have failed."). As far as compulsory education laws, the Seventh Circuit has held that these laws do "not render . . . schoolchildren so helpless
that an affirmative constitutional duty to protect arises." J.O., 909 F.2d at 272.
174. See Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 732 (rejecting availability of § 1983 due process claim under special
relationship test for severely mentally retarded female high school sexually assaulted by fellow male
high school student in gym shower); Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (residential school student).
175. See Horner & Norman, supra note 10, at 377-78.
176. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3rd Cir. 1992)
(denying recovery under §1983 due process claim for female school children sexually and verbally
assaulted by other students because school was just guilty of passivity); but see Maxwell, 53 F. Supp.
2d at 793 (finding § 1983 "creation of danger" claim properly stated).
177. As discussed below with regard to equal protection claims, see infra Part V. C. 2 and accompanying text, a claim of qualified immunity might also prevent relief against individual supervisory
officials.
178. 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
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tile sexual environment caused by a fellow male special education student. As
a result, the female student was repeatedly sexually assaulted over a significant
180
period of time. One of the claims that the victim brought was a constitutionally-based § 1983 action alleging deprivation of her constitutional right to equal
181
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In analyzing an equal protection claim in this context, the circuit court reasoned that although it was well-established that intentional sexual harassment
182
by a state actor could constitute a violation of the equal protection clause, the
student did not have a claim against the school itself because municipal liability
under § 1983 requires an official policy or custom to engage in sexual harass183
ment or an action by an official with final policymaking authority. Nevertheless, the court did find that there could be potential individual liability for the
principal and teachers for violating the sexually abused student’s equal protec184
tion rights.
Under an individual liability analysis, a supervisory employee may be held
185
liable for being deliberately indifferent to known sexual harassment. Deliberate indifference, as with Title IX, is a high standard and requires that, “a supervisor . . . participates in or consciously acquiesces in sexual harassment by an out186
side third party or co-[students].”
Because the plaintiff had alleged that the
principals and teachers knew of this sexually harassing behavior and acquiesced
in it, the court concluded that a constitutionally-based § 1983 claim based on the
187
equal protection clause was possible.

179. Id. at 1249.
180. Id. at 1243-44.
181. Id. at 1249.
182. Id. (citing Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 1989)); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist.
No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000) ("To succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in a discriminatory matter and that the discrimination was
intentional.") (citing FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also Flores v. Morgan
Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting sexual orientation peer harassment claim was brought under § 1983 equal protection theory).
183. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1249 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Randle
v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 446-50 (10th Cir. 1995)). Under even the most liberal construction, the
court found that acts of sexual harassment directed solely at the plaintiff do not "demonstrate a custom or policy of the School District to be deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment as a general
matter." Id. at 1250 (citing Monnell, 436 U.S. at 691 & n.56; see also supra note 135.
184. See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1250.
185. Id. At least one court has equated intentional discriminatory action and deliberate indifference in these cases. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 454 (7th Cir. 1996).
186. Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1250 (quoting Noland v. McAdoo, 39 F.3d 269, 271 (10th Cir. 1994)
(emphasis added)).
187. Id. at 1250-51. Courts have also held individual officials liable under a failure to train theory. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409-11 (1997). Under this theory, an individual school official may be held liable in a § 1983 action if evidence is presented that the official
failed to adequately train teachers, students, and others about a school's policies prohibiting harassment. See, e.g., Flores, 324 F.3d at 1136 (allowing a jury to decide a failure to train claim based on a
school failing to train school personnel on its policy concerning harassment on the basis of sexual
orientation). This theory may provide additional protections for bullied special education children
under the appropriate circumstances.
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Last, the court considered whether these individual defendants would be
188
entitled to qualified immunity from these § 1983 claims. Under § 1983 jurisprudence, individual defendants “are entitled to qualified immunity unless it is
demonstrated that their alleged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person in their positions would have
189
known.” To be clearly established, there must be binding precedential authority on point, or “the clearly established weight of authority from other [courts]
190
must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Because such sexual
harassment claims had been clearly established according to the Murrell court by
1999, the principal and teachers were not entitled to qualified immunity and the
191
plaintiff’s § 1983 equal protection claim against them could proceed.
VI. A SECOND PROPOSED REMEDY: AN IDEA-BASED § 1983 ACTION FOR MONEY
DAMAGES AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
Although the plaintiff in Murrell was permitted to use a constitutionallybased § 1983 claim based on the equal protection clause to address a bullying
case at school, the ruling in this case probably represents the exception rather
than the rule. As the concurring judge in Murrell stated with regard to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, “I emphasize that the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard pro192
vides a high hurdle for plaintiffs.”
Indeed, this deliberate indifference standard is very similar to the one that the Davis Court adopted for Title IX peer
193
sexual harassment cases. Consequently, it is unlikely that this type of § 1983
equal protection claim will provide sufficient additional legal options for a victim of more traditional bullying. This is especially so given that the allegations
in Murrell were so egregious that it also represented one of the rare cases in
which the plaintiff was equally successful in pursuing her Title IX peer sexual
194
harassment claim.
Unfortunately, it therefore does not appear that § 1983 provides much
assistance for children who are subjected to bullying and violence at school
under either Title IX or the due process and equal protection clauses of the
United States Constitution. Nevertheless, bullied special education children
may have a legal advantage in this regard. Although such plaintiffs may have
to, as discussed above, exhaust administrative remedies by participating in a
195
due process hearing under IDEA, once this requirement is satisfied, there
appears little reason why a § 1983 claim based on IDEA could not be brought
188. See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1251.
189. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
190. Id. (quoting Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992)).
191. See id. at 1251-52. Accord Flores, 324 F.3d at 1138 (sexual orientation harassment case).
192. Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1252 (Anderson, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Judge Anderson explained that this high hurdle is necessary, "given the myriad contacts which
occur daily in this country between teachers and students and between students and their peers." Id.
193. In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Flores utilized the Davis deliberate indifference standard in
defining the meaning of deliberate indifference in the context of individual liability under § 1983.
See Flores, 324 F.3d at 1135.
194. See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1249 (finding that plaintiff had properly stated a claim for which
relief could be granted under Title IX).
195. See supra Part V. B. 2.
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against a school official who has permitted bullying of a special education child
196
which leads to the violation of that child’s IDEA rights.
Such circumstances
may exist, for example, where a special education child is subject to ridicule and
taunting by other children based on his or her inability to live up to stereotypical
gender norms. If a school official is made aware of this situation and reacts by
moving the special education child from his or her mainstream placement for
his or her “own protection,” that school official may be engaging in behavior
which violates that child’s right to the least restrictive environment. Similarly, if
the bullying violates the child’s IEP and causes that child educational harm
(thereby interfering with the provision of a FAPE), such monetary relief may be
197
the only appropriate remedy under the circumstances.
Nevertheless, there is a lack of reported cases which have taken this § 1983
198
approach based on the IDEA statute. Although such claims should be legally
199
cognizable, only one case was located in which a special education student
200
sought money damages under IDEA for such a circumstance.
In that case,
however, the claim was for frustration of plaintiff’s right to a FAPE based on the
sexually harassing behavior of a mid-level administrator, rather than based on

196. See, e.g., Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 2002) (permitting an
IDEA-based § 1983 claim where all the alleged IDEA violations occurred while plaintiff was a student attending her high school). Even Professor Seligmann, who does not generally favor IDEAbased § 1983 suits for money damages, see Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar, supra note 104, at 536, recognizes that IDEA cases involving physical and verbal abuse claims represent the "the most appropriate [cases] for monetary relief," because "[t]hey are . . . the most sympathetic cases for the argument that the IDEA should support an award of monetary relief if the alleged acts violated the
children's IEPs and inappropriately caused them educational harm that could not be redressed prospectively through educational services and other compensatory relief." Id. at 530. Professor Seligmann's point of view is based on the assumption, with which I whole-heartedly agree, that such a
plaintiff be first required to exhaust their administrative remedies under IDEA. See id. But see Weber, Disability Harassment, supra note 26, at 1156-1157 (arguing that courts need to excuse exhaustion
of administrative remedies under IDEA in cases in which plaintiff seeks a monetary remedy).
197. See Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar, supra note 104, at 530. The availability of money damages
under an IDEA-based § 1983 claim assumes that the school officials in question are not entitled to
qualified immunity. See supra Part V. B. 2. Because the right to be free from sexual harassment at
school has been found to be clearly established as of 1999, see Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1251, qualified
immunity in most cases should not pose an obstacle for these § 1983 plaintiffs. Accord Weber, Disability Harassment, supra note 26, at 1142-1143.
198. See Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar, supra note 104, at 534. In fact, in one public school case in
which a special education student sued another special education student for physical and verbal
abuse, not only did the same-sex harassment in that case not lead to the assessment of damages
under Title IX, but there was no discussion by the court concerning the potential applicability of
IDEA to that case. See Wilson, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 690-91. Of course, this might be because the special
education student's attorney never alleged an IDEA action under § 1983. See id. (special education
plaintiff brought Title IX and "several state-law tort theories" for alleged sexual molestation and
same-sex harassment by fellow special education student); see also Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1242 & n.1
(noting special education plaintiff in opposite-sex peer harassment suit alleged Title IX, § 1983,
American with Disabilities Act, and Rehabilitation Act claims, but not IDEA claims).
199. A majority of courts also seem to permit, at least in some instances, an IDEA-based § 1983
claim for money damages for non-harassment, non-bullying circumstances. See Weber, Disability
Harassment, supra note 26, at 1118 (collecting cases); but see Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, Va., 141
F.3d 524, 532 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1998) (dismissing an IDEA-based § 1983 claim for denial of a FAPE).
200. See Frazier, 276 F.3d at 57.
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201

That being said, there does not
the bullying behavior of a fellow student.
appear to be any reason why the holding in that case could not support a claim
by a special education child who was bullied in a manner that interfered with
his or her IDEA rights.
Yet, there may be many other reasons why bullied special education
children, their parents, and their attorneys are not bringing such claims. It may
be because of the lack of deep pockets that individual school officials generally
202
possess, making such claims not worth the time and expense. Alternatively,
the lack of such claims may point to the fact that the administrative process
under IDEA does, in most cases, lead to a mutually satisfactory outcome for
203
both the parents of the special education child and the school district. Finally,
it may be because parents are framing these bullying claims as more in the
nature of a disability discrimination claim under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA, rather than as a harassment claim
204
which interferes with a special education child’s FAPE.
Whatever the case, the impetus behind this article has been to introduce a
couple of innovative and/or neglected legal approaches for helping special education children survive bullying when less drastic, non-legal measures fail. By
following either the hybrid Title IX-IDEA peer sexual harassment analysis, or
the IDEA-based § 1983 cause of action, the special education student may provide additional incentives to school officials to stop writing off bullying as just a
205
“normal part of growing up.”
VII. CONCLUSION
Given the increased research and anecdotal evidence of the long-term
adverse effects that school bullying inflicts on children, the time has come to
insist that judges, administrators, teachers, and parents stop ducking this public
health crisis and cease summarily dismissing such abusive behaviors as a rite of
passage through childhood. Unfortunately for most children, the current Title
IX framework for peer sexual harassment claims places an extremely high
burden on plaintiffs seeking to recover for bullying. Indeed, whether or not the
Supreme Court recognizes a same-sex harassment cause of action under Title IX

201. See id.
202. That being said, one commentator has suggested that there is something psychologically
fulfilling in being able to directly sue individuals responsible for your predicament, as opposed to a
disembodied institution. See Beth B. Burke, Note, To Preclude or Not to Preclude?: Section 1983 Claims
Surviving Title IX's Onslaught, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1487, 1491-92 (2000).
203. See Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar, supra note 104, at 534. Indeed, based upon my own
personal observations as a special education mediator, a large percentage of disputes between
parents of special education children and school districts are amicably resolved short of requiring a
due process hearing. But see Weber, Disability Harassment, supra note 26, at 1134 ("The exhaustion
requirement poses the single greatest obstacle to damages claims for disability harassment.").
204. See Weber, Disability Harassment, supra note 26, at 1138-1139.
205. But see Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar, supra note 104, at 535 & n.350 (arguing that constitutional claims for damages under § 1983, and claims for damages under the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA for special education discrimination provides sufficient "clout" to encourage school districts to comply with their special education obligations without requiring a money damage remedy
based on IDEA).
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as more responsive to traditional bullying conduct, the fact of the matter
remains that the Davis standard for imposing vicarious liability on school
systems is unlikely to change in the near future given the current composition of
the Supreme Court and Congress.
As discouraging as the legal situation appears for most bullied children,
this article suggests that there should be additional avenues of legal redress
available to bullied special education children based on their unique status
under federal law. As a result of the protections afforded by IDEA, these
children find themselves in a comparatively advantageous position in legally
fighting back against the bullies. By utilizing either a hybrid Title IX-IDEA
cause of action or an IDEA-based § 1983 cause of action, special education
children may be able to receive monetary compensation for the bullying they
suffer at school. At the same time, the existence of such remedies will help to
encourage a harassment-free education for special education children, and in the
long term, potentially help other children receive expanded civil rights
protection against bullying at school.

